【主讲】Xue Qiao (School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University)
【主题】Career Concerns, Beijing Style
【时间】2014年12月22日 (周一) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We study a model of overlapping principal-agent problems, where one of yesterday'sagents would be selected/promoted as today's principal, who then wields absolutepower free of checks and balances, and has discretion over how to select/promoteone of today's agents as tomorrow's principal. We use this model to theorize howa political system building on career concerns instead of checks and balances mayfunction. We call this a model of career concerns, Beijing style, which diers fundamentallyfrom one of career concerns, Holmstrom style, in that the disciplinary eectof career concerns exhibits inherent indeterminacy. The proper functioning of such apolitical system also relies on strong enough state capacity and an intermediate levelof decentralization. Small improvement in the rule of law or a mandatory merit-basedpromotion rule may inadvertently render such a political system unworkable.
