【主讲】杨扬 助理教授 (中山大学岭南学院)
【主题】Is Ignorance Bliss?
【时间】2015年3月27日 (周五) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼602室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper presents a two-round Prisoner’s Dilemma game with rematch-ing between rounds involving two player types, ‘Giver’ and ‘Takers’. Theformer have more cooperative intrinsic preferences than the latter. Two in-formation conditions are compared: in one, player types are revealed beforeactions are chosen. In the other, types remain private information. In bothcases, first round decisions are revealed to the (new) partners in round 2.When the proportion of Givers is sufficiently high, a Perfect Bayesian Equi-librium (PBE) for this game predicts higher cooperation rates when types arenot revealed. We study behavior in this game in a laboratory experiment. Incontrast to the PBE, the observations show that both types of players chooseto cooperate more often when types are revealed. We argue that the resultsimply that indirect reciprocity and bounded rationality combine to drive sub-jects’ decisions away from the equilibrium prediction. We also show that analternative theoretical approach based on an evolutionary process of imagescoring can explain 60% -70% of our experimental data.
