600期 5月26日 :Robust Rationalizability (joint work with Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong)(Satoru Takahashi, 新加坡国立大学)

发布者:系统管理员发布时间:2015-05-26浏览次数:166

【主讲】Satoru Takahashi (新加坡国立大学)

【主题】Robust Rationalizability (joint work with Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong)

【时间】2015年5月26日 (周二) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We propose a notion of "robust rationalizability": an action is robustly rationalizable for a given type if it is rationalizable for any small perturbation of higher-order beliefs of that type. We give a full characterization of robust rationalizability, and apply it to economic environments such as auctions and the Cournot competition. We also revisit Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), which, under a so-called richness assumption, provides a critique for selection/refinements based on global games.Our result delineates the boundary of the Weinstein-Yildiz critique.

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