【主讲】Bo Chen Associate Professor (Southern Methodist University)
【主题】To Join or not to Join: The Role of Information Structures in a Threshold Game
【时间】2015年6月2日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We analyze a multi-agent binary decision problem with a tipping point in thepresence of imperfect information and where individual agents have ordinal prefer-ences. An information structure summarizes what each agent can observe beforemaking her decision. Focusing on information structures where only aggregateinformationfrom past history can be observed, we fully characterize informationstructures that can lead to various (efficient and inefficient) Nash equilibria. Whenindividual decision making can be rationalized using a process of iterative dominance(Moulin (1979)), we derive a necessary and sufficient condition on the informationstructure under which one obtains a unique and efficient Nash equilibrium outcome.Our results suggest that if sufficient (and not necessarily perfect) information isavailable, coordination failure can be overcome without centralized intervention.
