【主讲】Nejat Anbarci 教授 (Deakin University, Australia)
【主题】Nash Demand Game with Endogenous Continuation Probability
【时间】2015年9月29日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We introduce a new variation on the Nash demand game (NDG). As is the case in the original NDG, if players' demands are compatible, each player receives their demand. If players' demands are not jointly feasible, the game continues with probability p; thus, it terminates with probability (1-p), in which case players receive zero payoffs. If the game continues, each player's proposal is selected at random with equal probabilities. The continuation probability in our variant of NDG is endogenous, however. This probability increases in the proximity of the players’ demands to each other. There are many different ways to generate such an endogenous continuation probability (ECP). We show that if an ECP has a particular continuity property and converges to zero even when the demands are very close to each other, all equilibrium outcomes of such ECPs converge to the Nash solution outcome.
