【主讲】Yujing Xu (香港大学)
【主题】Unobservable Investments and Search Frictions
【时间】2015年10月13日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper develops a pre-entry investment and random search framework to jointly study the investment incentives and trading efficiency. A seller entrant can make unobservable investments to decrease the production cost before searching for buyers. In the unique steady state equilibrium, investment and price dispersion emerge simultaneously with ex ante identical buyers and sellers. Despite the positive investments, when buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers, the equilibrium payoffs and social welfare are constant given any search friction and equal to the equilibrium values when investments are observable (indicating no investment). This novel property remains true even when the investment strategy becomes socially optimal as search frictions diminish.
