【主讲】沈剑飞 助教授 (Shandong University)
【主题】On the Equivalence Between (Quasi- ) Perfect and Sequential Equilibria
【时间】2013年5月28日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Backwards induction has been implemented in the literature through several equilibrium concepts for extensive form games.Extensive form perfect equilib-rium(Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium(Kreps and Wilson, 1982) and quasi-perfect equilibrium(van Damme, 1984) are (together with subgame perfection) the most prominent examples. Sequential equilibrium is the least demanding of these three concepts. Every extensive form perfect as well as every quasi-perfect equilibrium is sequential. In turn,Blume and Zame(1994) show that for generic extensive form games every sequential equilibrium is also extensive form perfect (henceforth simply perfect).
