【主讲】Chih-Chun Yang (Academia Sinica, Taiwan)
【主题】Subjective Coalitional Equilibria and Coalitional Rationalizability
【时间】2013年10月15日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】I propose a new notion of equilibrium in a finite normal form game where players are able to communicate by using correlated strategies and do not share a common prior belief. Subjective coalitional equilibrium is a refinement of Brandenburger and Dekel's (1987, Econometrica. 55, 1391-1402) a posteriori equilibrium. I prove that every finite normal form game has a subjective coalitional equilibrium. I show that Luo and Yang's (2009, JET 144, 248-263) coalitional rationalizable set is outcome equivalent to a subjective coalitional equilibrium. Moreover, under the assumption of independent common priors, subjective coalitional equilibria are ex ante identical to the intersection of the set of Nash equilibria and coalitional rationalizable sets.
