【主讲】薛小琳 讲师 (浙江大学经济学院)
【主题】Executive Compensation with Endogenous Risk and Asymmetric Cost
【时间】2014年3月4日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper examines executive compensation in an environment where a CEO performs two tasks for a shareholder: use her private information about investment opportunities to select a project, and then exert costly effort to carry out the selected project. First, I identify the optimal contract in this setting and the analysis focuses on how the optimal contract must be modified to account for unobservable investment decisions. Second, I examine how the interaction of the two managerial tasks affects investment decisions. Conditions are provided under which a more or less risky project than the shareholder desires is selected. Third, I study how the unobservability of investment decisions decreases the shareholder’s expected profit and distorts managerial decisions further than unobservable effort. Last, I look into the consequences for the shareholder of ignoring unobservable investment decisions in designing an executive compensation scheme.
