【主讲】Yuan Ju 高级讲师 (约克大学)
【主题】Rational Bargaining in Games with Coalitional Externalities
【时间】2014年4月8日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼602室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in envi- ronments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We investigate the strategic foundation of the RBS value by construct- ing an implementation mechanism. This mechanism extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players a higher degree of freedom to form coalitions. The same framework of bidding and renegotiation allows for natural variations of the RBS-mechanism. In this way, alternative "Shapley-like" values are obtained, and a unified platform to analyze and compare these solutions is provided.
