【主讲】Andre Veiga Postdoctoral Research Fellow (Oxford University)
【主题】Product Design in Selection Markets
【时间】2014年4月15日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Insurers choose plan characteristics to sort for profitable consumers. In a model with multidimensional types, this sorting incentive is proportional to the covariance, among marginal consumers, between marginal willingness-to-pay and cost to the in- surer. Standard forms of cost-sharing successfully repel costly consumers, but reducing plan comprehensiveness instead alienates the risk-averse. In a perfectly competitive equilibrium, the sorting incentive must vanish. Market power increases insurance qual- ity and welfare. Nonetheless, a competitive equilibrium with positive insurance is pos- sible when insurance value is sufficiently negatively correlated with cost. However, in a calibration toHandel, Hendel and Whinston(2013)’s data, equilibrium still fails to exist.
