【主讲】廖谋华 助教授 (厦门大学)
【主题】Head-hunters in the Labor Market
【时间】2014年4月21日 (周一) 15:30-17:00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper applies and extends Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) middlemen model to labor market to study the role of headhunters. In their model, there are three types of agents: producers, buyers, and middlemen, and three distinct matching processes. We introduce into their model two assumptions commonly used in the search models, constant-returns aggregate matching functions and free entry of firms (buyers) and headhunters (middlemen). Without their assumption that middlemen (headhunters) meet firms (buyers) more efficiently than do producers (workers), our model has an unique equilibrium with active headhunters and has a new welfare implication that workers are better off with the presence of headhunters. The driving force is that, in equilibrium, our headhunters maintain a enough low market tightness such that they find firms faster than workers do.
