【主讲】Takashi Kunimoto Associate Professor of Economics (Hitotsubashi University)
【主题】Interim Equilibrium Implementation
【时间】2014年5月30日 (周五) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solution concept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adopt interim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s interim beliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept and investigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incomplete information environments. I identify a set of conditions under which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible and moreover, argue that this identified set of conditions can be considered the weakest possible one in the literature. By doing so, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation and Nash implementation.
