【主讲】Li Jing 教授 (Kellog School of Management)
【主题】Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts
【时间】2011年12月19日 (周一) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】A worker interacts repeatedly with a manager who is privately informed about the opportunity costs of paying him. The worker therefore cannot distinguish non-payments that are efficiency enhancing from those that are rent extracting. The optimal relational contract generates periodic conflicts during which effort and expected profits decline gradually but recover instantaneously. To manage a conflict, the manager uses a mix of informal promises and formal commitments that evolves with the duration of the con.ict. Liquidity constraints limit the manager’s ability to manage conflicts but may also induce the worker to respond to a conflict by providing more effort rather than less.
