【主讲】Tracy Liu (清华大学)
【主题】Crowdsourcing with All-pay Auctions: a Field Experiment on Taskcn
【时间】2012年10月10日 (周三) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼602室
【语言】英文
【摘要】To understand the effects of incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a field experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using all-pay auction mechanisms. We systematically vary the size of the reward, and the presence of a soft reserve in the form of the early entry of a high-quality submission. We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and attracts higher quality users. However, unpredicted by theory, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments.
