【主讲】Jason Shachat 教授 (厦门大学王亚南经济研究院)
【主题】An experimental investigation of auctions and bargaining in procurement
【时间】2012年11月7日 (周三) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼710室
【语言】英文
【摘要】In reverse auctions, the buyers often retain the right to bargain for further concessions from the winner. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed the optimal form of auction-bargaining is an English auction followed by an auctioneer's option to engage in ultimatum bargaining with the winner. We study behavior and performance in this procurement format using a laboratory experiment. We find sellers closely follow the equilibrium strategy of exiting the auction at their cost and then uniformly accepting any strictly profitable offer. Further, the theory accurately predicts when the buyer chooses to engage in bargaining, but fails to predict the take-it-or-leave-it o er amount. We find that o ers depend upon the auction price when in theory they should not. We provide an explanation by which a buyers' subjective posterior regarding the winner's cost are distortions of the correct Bayesian posteriors, calculated using a common formulation of probability weighting. We show other typically proposed alternative models based upon risk aversion and anticipated regret are inconsistent with our experimental outcomes.
