【主讲】Bo Chen 助教授 (Southern Methodist University)
【主题】Decentralized market processes to stable job matchings with competitive salaries
【时间】2012年12月4日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼710室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We analyze a decentralized trading process in a basic labor market where finitely many heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly, and negotiate salaries with each other over time. Firms and workers may not have a complete picture of the entire market and can thus behave myopically in the process. Our main result establishes that, starting from an arbitrary market state of a matching of firms and workers and a vector of payoffs, a general random market process where each possible bilateral trade arises with positive probability converges with probability one to a competitive equilibrium of the market. An important auxiliary step toward this result is a novel construction of a finite sequence of successive bilateral trades that leads an arbitrary initial market state to a stable matching between firms and workers with a scheme of competitive salary offers.
