【主讲】Pohan Fong 助教授 (香港城市大学)
【主题】Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Proposers
【时间】2013年3月5日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We present a theory of dynamic legislative bargaining in which (1) the the policy made in one period becomes the status quo for the next, and (2) every proposer is endogenously determined through an all-pay auction. We fully characterize the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for a model with three parties, a one-dimensional policy space, single-peaked preferences and symmetric distribution of the ideal points. We show that the median party never participates actively in the contest for proposal power. Thus the model predicts that key positions with agenda control would not be occupied by politicians with moderate ideological views. We also show that the two extreme parties as proposer would propose more moderate policy than they would otherwise do in a single-period setup. This is due to the incentive to alleviate future competition costs. Overall the long-run policy choice is bounded away from the median policy provided the players are sufficiently impatient. But the generalized median voter theorem of Baron (1996) still holds if the parties are sufficiently patient.
