【主讲】Pei-yu Lo 助教授 (香港大学)
【主题】Why Does New Hampshire Matter-- Simultaneous v.s. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates
【时间】2013年3月12日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】In a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate from a private signal. I show that if private signals are sufficiently precise, an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate increases. In this unique equilibrium, voters behave more sincerely if they worry less about their worst choice winning. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning early primaries improves a candidate's chance of winning later primaries. I show that sequential primaries alleviate coordination failure , but put more weight on the preference of median voters in early primaries. When voters worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries.
