【主讲】Zhang Jun 助教授 (上海财经大学国际工商管理学院)
【主题】Optimal Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Interaction
【时间】2013年3月19日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼710室
【语言】英文
【摘要】It is natural that sellers usually face buyers who involve in certain aftermarket interaction: T-mobil, licence, patent, etc. Although the seller has relatively strong power in the initial market to place her item, she usually has little control over the aftermarket interaction.
Nevertheless, the seller can influence the aftermarket outcome. Such consideration has attracted significant attention in the auction literature: Das Varma (2003), Goeree (2003), Scarpatetti and Wasser (2010), Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008).
What is the optimal mechanism taking into consideration of the aftermarket interaction. The difficulty: the interaction of hidden information, hidden actions and multiple agents. We aim to examine how aftermarket interaction affects optimal mechanism design in a simplest setup. IA government chooses whether to issue a new licence to a privately informed entrant for an industry currently occupied by a monopoly, and aftermarket competition is Cournot upon entry.
