【主讲】李三希 讲师 (中国人民大学)
【主题】Contract Bargaining with Risk-averse Agent
【时间】2013年4月2日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper is the first to study a Nash bargaining model in a moral hazard framework where the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. We show that the power of incentives increases with the Agent's bargaining power if the contracts induce a high effort. However, under reasonable assumptions about the agent's utility function, the contracts induce a high effort less often as the agent's bargaining power increases. As for the social welfare, we are surprised to find that a utilitarian, who cares about the sum of the two parties' certainty equivalents, is worse off as the agent's bargaining power increases. These results are in sharp contrast to the literature, which features risk-neutral agents protected by limited liability. Our results are consistent with evidence in the insurance market, which suggest that group insurance contracts often offer higher levels of coverage, lower deductibles and lower out-of-pocket maximum spending limits than individual insurance contracts.
