【主讲】Frances Zhiyun Xu (University of Hong Kong)
【主题】Information Acquisition in a War of Attrition
【时间】2011年3月15日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper analyzes information acquisition in a war of attrition with the stochastic arrival of a public signal that reveals the state of nature and ends the game. Players can acquire information about the state of nature any time during the game. We study how the incentive to acquire information interacts with verifiability of the acquired information. When information is verifiable, players have only an incentive to free ride on the opponent's information acquisition, so there is an inefficient delay in information acquisition. When information is unverifiable, there is an additional incentive to catch up on information acquisition to prevent the opponent from extracting information rents, which causes duplication in information acquisition. We show that the interplay of these incentives has interesting policy implications and, in particular, conflicts are resolved faster when information is unverifiable.
