【主讲】Daniel Krähmer (波恩大学)
【主题】Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
【时间】2011年9月20日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations of buyers. Under the assumption that the seller announces the mechanism before investing, the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which leaves buyers no information rent and leaves the seller indifferent between his investments. Under these conditions, the seller can, in fact, extract the first best surplus almost fully.
