【主题】Performance Bundling across Multiple Competitions
【报告人】王哲伟（教授，山东大学）
【时间】4月12日（星期五） 15：30-17：00
【地点】经济学院楼401
【语言】英文
【摘要/Abstract】In a multi-project contract environment with a single agent who is subject to limited liability, the optimality of performance bundling across all projects is well established: The agent should be rewarded only if all projects are successful. In this paper, we study performance bundling across multiple competitions between two (possibly asymmetric) players. We find that in addition to a beneficial cost-saving effect that diminishes with asymmetry across players, performance bundling causes a counterproductive unbalancing effect, which intensities with this asymmetry. Thus, performance bundling is desirable only if the players are sufficiently symmetric. Otherwise, a set of independent contests is optimal.
【简介】王哲伟博士，2010年从爱丁堡大学获得经济学博士学位，现为山东大学经济学院教授，副院长。他的研究领域包括竞赛理论和产业组织理论，其成果曾发表于J. Math Econ, JEBO, Econ. Inquiry等期刊。
