【主题】A Rational Inattention Unemployment Trap
【报告人】Martin Ellison（教授，牛津大学）
【时间】5月17日（星期五） 15：30-17：00
【地点】经济学院701
【语言】英文
【摘要/Abstract】We show that introducing rational inattention into a model with uninsurable unemployment risk can generate multiple steady states, when the same model with full information has a unique steady state. The model features heterogeneity and persistence in household labour market expectations, consistent with survey evidence. In a heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model, we find that rational inattention to the future hiring rate generates a high unemployment steady state with moderate inflation, and an unemployment trap with very low (but positive) inflation and a low job hiring rate.
【简介】Martin Ellision教授于2001年获得佛罗伦萨欧洲大学研究所的经济学博士学位，现为牛津大学经济学教授，并担任牛津大学纳菲尔德学院应用宏观分析组主任及英国经济政策研究中心研究员。Ellison教授曾在英格兰银行担任顾问并在华威大学任职。其研究领域为宏观经济学，主要是货币政策。目前也为Journal of Money, Credit and Banking及Central Bank Review等杂志担任编辑工作。
