【报告人】Jingyi Xue, Associate Professor, Singapore Management University
【时间】2022年12月16日 周五下午 14:30-16:00
【地点】ZOOM会议ID： 867 6685 0972，密码：251194
【摘要】We define notions of dominance between two actions in a dynamic game. Local dominance considers players who have a blurred view of the future and compare actions by first focusing on the outcomes that may realize at the current stage. When they consider the possibility that the final outcome will realize in the future, they can check that the local comparison is not overturned only if the continuation game is sufficiently simple. Despite the lack of planning, local dominance solves dynamic mechanisms that were found easy to play and implement social choice functions that cannot be implemented in obviously-dominant strategies.
【报告人简介】薛静怡，新加坡管理大学经济学院副教授。2013年获得美国莱斯大学经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为理论微观经济学，机制设计理论和决策论。研究成果发表在Journal of Economic Theory，Economic Theory, Social Choice and Welfare, 等学术期刊上。