【主题】Pick-an-object Mechanisms
【报告人】Inácio Bó，西南财经大学，副教授
【时间】2023年3月21日周二下午14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院大楼701会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms, as well as the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, but implements commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and top trading cycles, which are not OSP-implementable. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that agents are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts.
【报告人简介】Inácio Bó, Ph.D in Economics from Boston College (USA) (2008-2014) , was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center (Germany) (2014-2019), Lecturer (Assistant Professor) at the Department of Economics and Related Studies at the University of York (U.K.) (2019-2021), and is since April 2019 an Associate Professor at the China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance - SWUFE. Prof Bó’s research interests include Market Design, Matching Theory, and Experimental Economics.