【主题】Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information
【报告人】王子伟，武汉大学经济与管理学院，助理教授
【时间】2023年4月11日周二14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院大楼701会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition of uninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self-consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion of stability for a given set of outcomes, and then iteratively apply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. We then provide two additional characterizations of our solution concept. The first characterization links the non-equilibrium approach we pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition.
【报告人简介】王子伟，武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为博弈论，匹配理论和信息经济学。研究成果发表于经济学国际期刊Social Choice and Welfare，并担任Games and Economic Behavior，Review of Economic Design等期刊的匿名审稿人。