经鸿之粟 | 桂姗助理教授合作论文在经济学国际一类期刊正式发表
2026-03-10
近日,上海财经大学经济学院微观经济学系桂姗助理教授合作论文Evaluating Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanisms: Theory and Experiment在经济学国际一类期刊Games and Economic Behavior正式发表。摘要We study dynamic mechanism design in non-clairvoyant environments, where sellers cannot forecast future demand and buyers hold private information. Using two laboratory experiments, we evaluate two non-clairvoyant mechanisms: the dynamic maximin- optimal non-clairvoyant mechanism (DM, Mirrokni et al. (2020)) and the repeated static optimal mechanism (RS, Myerson (1981)). Experiment 1 compares DM and ...